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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATJ1~ OF UTAH, in the Interest of 
MICHAEL PATRICK KELSEY, 
a pPrson undPr 18 years of age. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10840 
Apiwal from the Decree of the District Juvenile Court 
for Utah County, State of Utah, 
Honorable M. J. Paxman, Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding in which appellants seek leave 
to adopt the said minor, Michael Patrick Kelsey. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was heard before the Hon. M. J. Pax-
man, Judge of the Juvenile Court for Utah County, State 
of Utah, and from a decree adjudging that the care, 
custody, control and guidance of said Michael Patrick 
Kelsey are awarded to his natural father and directing 
appellants, Leonard and Patsy Oldham, to forthwith re-
turn said .Michael Patrick Kelsey to l1is said fathf~r, 
appellants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of said decree and judg-
ment granting petitioners leave to adopt said Michael 
Patrick Kelsey, or that failing a new hearing. 
STAT'EMENT OF FACTS 
The record on appeal in this matter consists of the 
main record hereinafter referred to as (R.); a supple-
mental record hereinafter referred to as (S. R.); tran-
script of hearing January 7, 1963, hereinafter referred 
to as (T1); and transcript of hearing April 7, 1966 here-
inafter referred to as (T2 ). 
That by decree of the Juvenile Court for Utah 
County entered January 7, 1963, said Michael Patrick 
Kelsey, hereinafter ref erred to as l\fichael, was declared 
neglected and dependant and was placed with the Utah 
County Department of Public Welfare for foster care 
( R. 9). This decree was based upon a finding of said 
court that the natural mother and legal custodian of the 
child had psychological problems interfering with her 
ability to provide a proper home for him (R. 9). 
The natural father of the child, David L. Kelsey, 
testified on January 7, 1963, that he was not in a position 
to give the child a home (T1 2). The matter was reviewed 
agam .T anuary 6, 1964; there was no change as to the 
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order com·erning .Michael (R. 14). An order for continu-
ance was entered January 13, 1965 (R. 17). 
Petitioners received the custody of said Michael on 
or about l\lay 7, 1963 when he was 3 years of age (R. 9) 
and he is still in their custody (T2 5, R. 49, S.R. 40). On 
March 28, 1966, appellants filed a peti6on in said juvenile 
court asking for leave of said court to adopt said Michael 
Thereafter a summons was served upon the natural 
father, David L. Kelsey (R. 21), and upon the natural 
mother, Tera.lee S. Neeley (R. 22). The hearing of said 
petition was held on April 7, 1966. The natural parents 
appeared with their attorney, Herbert B. Maw. The 
petitioners and appellants appeared in person and by 
their attorney, Robert C. Cummings. 
Appellants were married November 16, 1940 (T2 3), 
and they testified that they have eight children including 
Michael (T2 3). Appellants are employed as psychiatric 
technicians for the State of California, Department of 
Mental Hygiene (T2 2, 30). Appellants have a stable and 
happy marriage (T2 3, 11) and are family oriented (T2 
4, 31). Michael has been accepted in the home of appel-
lants the same as if he had been born to them (T2 12, 13). 
He treats them as his parents (T2 10, 33) and has no 
recollection of his natural parents (T2 9, 12, 16). He has 
been in the home of appellants since he was three years 
of age (R. 9). When he came into the home of appellants 
he had serious problems of fear and anxiety (T2 6, 8, 32). 
Since being in the home of appellants he has developed 
into a fine, healthy, young boy (T·2 9, 10). 
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Dean Odell Peck, a teacher at Sacramento ,Junior 
College, testified to the stability of appellants home and 
to the good adjustment Michael has madP in it (T:.i 18-21). 
Testimony to the same effect was given by Bonnie Peck 
(T2 22-24), and by Melvin l\Iiller, a member of the armed 
forces (T2 28-30). Dr. Steven L. VanWagonen, Michael's 
physician, testified that in his opinion taking Michael 
from appellants would have the following result: "I 
would estimate that it probably would upset him emo-
tionally and would probably aggravate the bed wetting 
and increase it." (T2 27). 
Apparently the natural mother does not seek custody 
of Michael (S.R. 1). As of October 15, 1963, she had 
remarried and was pregnant ( S.R. 1). It appears that as 
of January 12, 1965, she had 3 children in her home under 
six years of age (S.R. 17). Report of March 4, 1965, 
indicates 4 children under 6 in her home (S.R. 23). 
The natural father, David L. Kelsey, has been di-
vorced from the natural mother, Teralee Kelsey (R. 1). 
Thf' natural father is employed ( T 2 38) and now married 
to Grace Montano. They were married May 26, 1965 
( T 2 41) although it appears the natural father misrepre-
sented his marital status to the juvenile court thereto-
fore (R. 17). The natural father's present wife was 
married before and had six children by said marriage; 
their custody was awarded to their father (T2 63). One 
of these children was with David L. Kelsey and his pres-
Pnt wife at the time of the hearing (T2 42). The natural 
fathPr, David L. Kelsey an<l his present wife are of dif-
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ferent religious faiths ( T~ 42, 66). Two other children 
of the natural parents, who were taken from them at 
the time Michael was, have since been returned to the 
natural father and his present wife (R. 14). At the 
time of the hearing of April 7, 1966, the natural father 
and his present wife had some difficulty in their home 
between the natural father's children and his present 
wife's child (T2 49). It appeared that while the natural 
father's three children were together there was some 
problem between Michael and his older brother, Kelly 
arising from personality differences (T2 45, 53). The 
natural father is an occasional drinker (T2 52) and testi-
fied that he had a lot of bills ( T 2 52). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on April 7, 1966, the 
court requested briefs from counsel and same were filed 
(R. 4-0, 46). Attorney for the natural father at the time 
of filing his brief also filed a petition for custody (R. 47). 
Said petition has not yet been heard. 
On January 11, 1967, the said Juvenile Court made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Decree (R. 48, 49). 
Thereafter on petition of appellants an order was entered 
on January 20, 1967, staying said decree (R. 51, 50) in 
accordance with Section 55-10-112, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. Appellants filed their notice of appeal 
February 8, 196'7. The main record including transcripts 
\\~as filed in this court March 14, 1967. 
A supplemental record was filed in the Supreme 
Court April 6, 1967. Said supplemental record contains 
the social studies and reports in this matter which are 
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n~quired as part of the record pursuant to said Section 
5:5-10-112. The report of "\Villiam L. Bailey, Jr. dated 
:M areh 18, 1964 ( S.R. 7), revealPd that Michael was 
idt>ntifying vt>ry closely with appellants and that his 
feelings for his foster siblings "have heen identified as 
very wann and affectionate as theirs is for him." Foster 
Care Review of Dallas C. Thompson dated October 20, 
19()4 (S.R. 8), showed that l\Jichael's adjustment in thr 
home of appellants appears to be sound. Report of 
October 30, 1964, of Fay R. Nelson, child welfare worker, 
indicated some difficulty in obtaining information from 
the natural father and his present wife and indicates 
problems between the natural father's present wife and 
her own children, and contains the suggestion that 
Michael not be returned at that time (S.R. 13, 14). Social 
Study by child welfare worker, Dallas C. Thompson, 
dated January 12, 1965 (S.R. 16-19) reveals misrepre-
sentations on the part of the natural father in connection 
\\-ith obtaining his other two children and points out 
that the natural father has little concern or insight into 
the needs and welfare of his children. He recommends 
that the natural father be permanently deprived of the 
eustody of l\f ichael and that serious consideration should 
lw given as to whether or not the other two children 
should he removed from his custody ( S.R. 18). He also 
n'comrnended that the natural mother not receive Michael 
at that time (S.R. 17). His conclusion was that the next 
hearing should determine whether Michael should be 
returm•d to his natural mother or "whether an adoptive 
ordPr should be givt'n an<l l\fiehael allowed to stay in the 
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present home when• he is residing, a home that is very 
strong and in which Michael has obtained a solid adjust-
ment and a houw in which adoption is both possible and 
desirable." A social study dated March 15, 1965 (S.R. 
:20-22) points out that the natural father appears to be 
a very immature person, and points out a rather nebulous 
relationship between the natural father and his present 
wife, hut does indicate a good relationship between the 
natural father and the two children in his custody, and 
although the report questions whether these two children 
should remain with the father, it concludes that for the 
prPsent they should. There seems to have been no issue 
of returning Michael at that time (S.R. 20). In a sooial 
study dated March 17, 1965, by Dallas C. Thompson, 
child welfare worker, his recommendation was that the 
appPllants be allowed to adopt Michael. He pointed out 
that replacing Michael, according to the best knowledge 
in the field of child welfare, would be devastating to 
him ( S.R. 25). Recommendation that appellants be al-
lowed to adopt Michael was renewed in report of said 
Dallas C. Thompson, dated May 11, 1965 (S.R. 27). In 
social study by John K. Taylor, child welfare worker, 
dated August 30, 1965, it is recommended that the parents 
he permanently deprived and that appellants be allowed 
to adopt Michael stating that his records reflect a history 
of immaturity and promiscuity on behalf of both parents 
(S.R. 28). 
The record contains a letter dated September 29, 
1965, from George E. Ballif, Deputy County Attorney 
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of Ptah County (S.R. 30) in which he states his opinion 
that the natural parents cannot be permanently deprived 
of eustody of Michael. Tlwreafter .John K. Taylor, child 
welfare worker, made a report to the court on October 
20, 1965, in whieh he states that assmning a permanent 
order cannot be given "it may be better to formulate 
other plans such as returning to one of his natural par-
ents before too much additional time lapses which delay 
will impose a hardship upon the Oldhams and may delay 
Michael's adjusting to a new home situation." In a social 
study by John K. Taylor, child welfare worker, dated 
February 9, 1966, it was recommended that Michael be 
returned to his father. This review refers to the afore-
said letter by attorney Ballif as follows: "Since the last 
review a letter requesting permanent deprivation was 
originated, however, Attorney Ballif, decreed the agency 
had insufficient evidence for such an order" (S.R. 40). 
A social study dated December 29, 1962, indicates prob-
lems with the natural parents in the area of promis-
euity ( S.R. 42, 43). A report dated November 17, 
1965, by .James A. Anderson indicates a measure of 
stability had been achieved by the natural father and 
expresses the opinion that the natural father and his 
present wife have the "ability" to care for Michael ( S.R. 
37). The natural father has paid support money for 
Michael (T2 40). '"Phe natural father has not seen Michael 




THE DECREE DIRECTING APPELLANTS TO RETURN 
MICHAEL PATRICK KELSEY TO HIS NATURAL FATHER 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In its findings of fact (R. 49) the Juvenile Court 
makeR the following finding: 
"It appears to the Court, from the evidence 
presented, that Michael's best welfare would be 
Rerved by remaining in the foster home provided 
hy the Oldhams ... " 
The Court then goes on to state in effect that never-
theless it does not feel that it is allowed under Section 
55-10-109 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, to make 
any other order, since at the time of the hearing the 
court does not find the natural father unfit, incompetent 
or to have abandoned Michael. It is the appellants' con-
tention that once the court finds that the best welfare 
of a child requires that he remain in a foster home, a 
decree depriving them of the child cannot be justified, 
where that situation is one brought about by the 
natural parents. Michael was placed in a foster home 
only because neither pa.rent could adequately provide 
for him. Under such circumstances the parents must 
assume the consequences of their action. It is not argued 
that in all cases a child should be placed where his best 
interest requires. If this were so, a child could be re-
moved from a home no matter how good, and placed in 
another home as long as the new home would in general 
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lw better for the ehild. That is not the case here, how-
~~w·r. ln this case the ehild was placed with appellants 
not just because they could give him more than his na-
tural part>nts, hut becamw his natural parents could not 
provide for him. The child is thus placed in a new en-
vironment not by outsided authority alone, but by the 
aet of the parents. The natural parents having thus 
created the situation, rannot romplain of its conse-
quences, and particularly cannot thereafter insist upon 
a course of aetion contrary to the best interests of the 
ehild. 'rlrns a ehild cannot be taken from parents and 
given to another just because the other can give the 
ehild more. But where the parent gives up the ehild, 
for whatever reason, and plact>s the child in a condition 
or situation which result in certain needs for that child, 
then the parent's rights must become subordinate to the 
best interest of the child. If the child's best interest 
requires that he remain where he is, then this must 
control. Such is the case here. Due to the natural 
mother's mental illness and inadequacy and due to the 
natural father's inability to care for the child, Michael 
was placed with other parents when he was three years 
old. The evidence shows that appellants are now in the 
eyes of the child his rea.l parents. To take this child from 
the only parents he remembers and to place him with a 
father he does not remember and with a step mother, 
whom he has never even met, is not only against his 
hest interest, as the court found, but would be inhuman. 
\Vt> cannot suppose that the legislature ever intended 
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such a rt>sult to follow from tht> wording of said Section 
55-10-109. 
lt is evident that the juvenile court felt compelled 
because of its interpretation of Section 55-10-109 to 
deprive appellants of Michael. If this court decides that 
the juvenile court was not compelled, as it thought it 
was, to take Michael from appellants, then since the 
juvenile court has found it in his best interest to stay 
with appellants, this Court can and should reverse said 
deeree and grant appellants leave to adopt said minor, 
or at the very least the decree should be reversed and 
the case returned to the juvenile court for action in the 
light of the interpretation given said section by this 
Court. 
The juvenile court concluded that Section 55-10-109 
m this case compelled the court to take Michael from 
appellants and return him to his natural father. This 
seems to be based upon his finding that the "natural 
father cannot be found to be unfit or incompetent or 
to have abandoned Michael." This of course is a finding 
as of the last hearing of April 7, 1966, since the court 
found the child neglected and dependent initially on 
.r anuary 7, 1963 (R. 9). Appellants submit that this 
initial finding under Utah law permits the court to 
permanently deprive a natural parent of custody where 
thereafter the best interest of the child requires it. This is 
eertainly the case under the law as it existed on January 
7, 1963, when the child was found to be neglected and 
dt>pendent and appellant submits that is the same under 
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th<> law of Utah a:-1 it existed on the date of the last hear-
ing on April 7, 19G7, and on the date of the decree ap-
pealed from, .January 11, 1967. This appears evident 
from an examination of the law. 
8ection 55-10-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
a11u:•nded (all statutory references herein are to the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, unless otherwise indi-
cated) enumerates the areas, unless otherwise provided 
by law, in which the juvenile court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction. Subsection ( 5) thereof provides: "To ter-
minate the legal parent-child relationship, including 
termination of residual parental rights and duties as 
defined herein." The phrase, "Residual parental rights 
and duties," is defined in Subsection 55-10-64 (10) as 
follows: 
''Residual parental rights and duties" means 
those rights and duties remaining with the parent 
after legal custody or guardianship, or both, have 
been vested in another person or agency, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the responsibility for sup-
port, the right to consent to adoption, the right 
to determine the child's religious affiliation, and 
the right to reasonable visitation unless restricted 
by the court. If no guardian has been appointed, 
"residual parental rights and duties" also include 
the right to consent to marriage, to enlistment, 
and to consent to major medical, surgical, or 
psychiatric treatment. 
The phrase "Termination of parental right" is de-
fined in Subsection 55-10-64 (14) as follows: 
"Termination of parental rights" means the per-
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manent elimination of all parental rights and 
duties, including residual parental rights and 
duties, by court order. 
Section 55-10-100 enumerates the various disposi-
tions the juvenile court can make of a case once the court 
acquires jurisdiction of a child in accordance with Sec-
ti on 55-10-77. Subsection 55-10-100 (16) provides: 
The court may terminate all parental rights pro-
vided that the provisions of section 55-10-109 are 
complied with. 
Section 55-10-109 provides that the court may decree 
a termination of all parental rights with respect to one 
or both parents if the court finds: 
(a) That the parent or parents are unfit or in-
competent by reason of conduct or condition seri-
ously detrimental to the child; or 
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned 
the child ... 
( c) That after a period of trial, during which the 
child was left in his own home under protective 
supervision or probation, or during which the 
child was returned to live in his own home, the 
parent or parents substantially and continuously 
or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child 
proper parental care and protection. 
It appears that the issue of the fitness or compe-
tence of the parents by reason of conduct or condition 
refers to the time the court acquires jurisdiction of the 
case at least it appears that being unfit or incompetent 
at that time satisfies the statute. In the first place, it 
is the initial conduct or condition which makes it neces-
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sar~· for tlw court to assume jurisdiction, and certainly 
the parents must bear the responsibility for circwn-
staneps whieh arise as the result of juvenile court action, 
including foster homes, Pk. Thus if a child makes a 
wholesome adjustment in a foster home and it appears 
for his best interest that the child remain in that home, 
the parents eannot be heard to complain just because 
in the meantime they have improved their situation. The 
praents must bear the responsibility for whatever situa-
tion their original conduct has brought about. Further, 
Subsection 55-10-100 (18) states: 
Before depriving any parent of the custody of his 
or her child, the court shall give due consideration 
to the pref erred right of parents to the custody 
of their children, as expressed in section 55-10-63, 
and shall not tr an sf er custody to another person, 
agency, or institution, unless the court finds from 
all the circumstances in the case that the welfare 
of the child or the public interest requires that 
the child be taken from his home. 
Thus the Act expressly provides that the juvenile 
court once jurisdiction attaches, can deprive a parent of 
custody where the welfare of the child requires it. No 
time limit is set so it appears the court can deprive the 
parent indefinitely so long as the welfare of the child 
requires it. It cannot be supposed that the legislature 
intended to provide that despite the change in or re-
pentence of the parent, the court (where the welfare of 
the child requires it) can in effect deprive the parent of 
custody of the child in effect without time limit but can-
not terminate parental rights in such a case. Such a 
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result \Yould be ridiculous. Furthermore, Subsection 
!15-10-100 ( 19) provides : 
An order under this section for probation or 
placement of a child with an individual or an 
agency shall include a date certain for a review 
of the case by the court, with a new date to be 
set upon each review. In reviewing foster home 
placements, special attention shall be given to 
making adoptable children available for adoption 
without delay. 
The foregoing Subsection seems to show a preference 
on the part of the legislature for adoption rather than 
an extended deprivation of custody situation with re-
views from time to time. Section 55-10-63 states that the 
act shall be liberally construed to achieve the goals there 
set forth which appear basically to be the welfare of the 
child and the best interest of the state. 
Under the old act it was provided in Section 55-10-32 
Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
No child as defined in this chapter shall be taken 
from the custody of its parents or legal guardian 
without the consent of such parents or legal 
guardian, unless the court shall find from the evi-
dence introduced in the case that such parent or 
legal guardian is incompetent, or has knowingly 
failed and neglected to provide for such child the 
proper maintenance, care, training, and education 
contemplated and required by both law and 
morals, or unless a child being a ward of the court, 
has been tried on probation in the custody of its 
parents or legal guardian and has failed to re-
form; or unless either parent, having full custody 
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and control over a child, or the child's legal 
t,111ardian, has been convicted of a felony; or un-
less the court shall find from all circumstances in 
the case that the public welfare or the welfare of 
a child requires that his custody be taken from its 
parents or legal guardian. 
Said Section 55-10-109 appears to be substantially the 
same as said section 55-,10-32 as far as the grounds for 
taking a child from its parents are concerned. Hence 
by virtue of Section 55-10-122 (which is hereinafter set 
out) Section 55-10-109 is to be construed as a restate-
ment and continuation of said Section 55-10-32 and not 
as a new enactment. Said Section 55-10-122 provides: 
The provisions of this act, to the extent that they 
are substantially the same as existing statutory 
provisions relating to the same subject matter, 
shall be construed as restatements and continua-
tions thereof, and not as new enactments. 
It follows that Supreme Court decisions under the 
old law will attach to the new law in this area. In the 
case of In re State of Utah, in the Interest of R ...... L ...... , 
a minor child, 17 Utah2d 349, 411 P.2nd 839, this Court 
refused to reverse the decree of the juvenile court per-
manently depriving a parent of the custody of her child 
despite the alleged rehabilitation of the parent where 
this court found in effect that it was in the best interest 
of the child to remain ·with the foster parents. 
In other cases this Court has made it clear that in 
custody matters the welfare of the child comes first. 
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In the case of Dearden v. Dearden, 15 Utah2d 105, 388 
P.2d 230, at page 107 this Court said: 
This court has consistently declared that in cus-
tody maters the paramount consideration is the 
welfare of the child. 
ln Oleen v. Oleen, 15 U.2d 326, 392 P.2d 792 this court 
said at page 329: 
Child custody cases are highly equitable in char-
acter and the controlling factor in such cases is 
usually the best interest and welfare of the child. 
Further, the best interest of the child seems to have been 
paramount in the following cases: State in Interest of 
K ______ B_ _____ , 7 U.2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958). State in Inter-
est of C, 9 U.2d 345, 344 P.2d 981 (1959); In re State in 
Interest of Black, 3 U.2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955); and 
State in Interest of L.J .• J., 11 U.2d 393, 360 P.2d 486 
(1961). 
There is certainly no indication that the legislature 
intended to change the foregoing in any way in enacting 
the new juvenile court law. In accord with the view that 
the best interest of the child is paramount is the follow-
ing statement by Henry H. Foster, Jr. in Family Law, 
1960 Annual Survey of American Law at page 420: 
"Obviously, both flexibility and discretion are 
necessary and desirable. But there should be cer-
tain guideposts. For example, in determining 
what really is in the 'best interests' of the child, 
prima facie one having de facto custody, if a 'fit 
person,' should be awarded custody over a parent 
whose only basis for claim is blood relationship. 
18 
Aetual bonds of lon' and affection should prevail 
over hypothetical ones. Moreover, the preference 
of a child competent to choose should be prima 
facie determinativP. Courts should not adopt the 
pt>rspeetive that a natural parent has a vested 
property interest in a child nor start with the 
naive premise that the 'best interests' of the child 
inexorably require an award to the parent. Courts 
should have the responsibility of seeing to it that 
all relevant data concerning the child's actual 
welfare appear in the record, so that an intelligent 
and humane decision may be reached. In many 
eases expert testimony and background investiga-
tions and reports by court personnel would be 
helpful or are essential.'' 
POINT 2 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING 
THAT THE NATURAL FATHER CANNOT BE FOUND TO 
BE UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT OR TO HA VE ABANDONED 
MICHAEL AND CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST 
THAT FINDING, AND REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT 
DIFFER IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NATURAL PAR-
ENTS ARE UNFIT AND INCOMPETENT. 
The record reveals immaturity and indiscretion on 
the part of the natural father and mother. Even so it is 
not necessary that appellants demonstrate that the 
natural parents are evil or disreputable persons. It is 
nevertheless appellants'position that they are unfit and 
incompetent within the meaning of said Section 55-10-109. 
Said Section provides: "(a) That the parent or parents 
are unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct or condi-
tion seriously detrimental to the child ... " 
It is submitted that the conduct of the father in giv-
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ing up the child in the first place at the agP of :3, whirh 
conduct has result in and necessitated leaving Michael 
in foster can~ until he is now 7 years of age (lw will lw 
t\ on .July :30, 1967) render him unfit and incompetent 
within tlw meaning of the statute. It is submitted that 
his present condition where the testimony shows trouble 
in his present home between his ehildren and a child of 
his present wife render him unfit and incompetent within 
the meaning of the statute. End<:'r the statute, a person 
is unfit and incompetent where his conduct or condition 
is seriously detrimental to the child. Thus the determin-
ing· factor is whether the conduct or condition is detri-
mental to the child, not whether the conduct or condition 
is wilfull, careless, malicious, noble, or self-sacrificing in 
and of itself. It is submitted that under the statute a 
person of unexcelled righteousness, engaged in the nob-
lest pursuit is unfit and incompetent if this conduct is 
detrimental to the child. Thus for example a self-sacrific-
ing physician dedicating his life to the furthering of the 
science of medicine and to saving lives might well be 
found unfit if in so doing he was not giving adequate 
time and attention to his child, or if in the process was 
subjecting his child to needless hazard. Thus in this 
<'.ase although the father has paid support for Michael, 
although he has remarried, and although he underst.and-
ably wants Michael, and although he has apparently sta-
bilir,ro his life to some degree at least, these virtues and 
any others that could be named do not make him fit and 
eompetent within the meaning of the statute if it would 
be seriously detrimental to Michael to return him. The 
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natural fatlu•r is a stranger to Michael, his present wife 
is a 8trangPr and the ('hilclren in the natural fathers 
home are strangers to Michael. All of this was hrought 
ahout hy the natural father and it is his "condition"; and 
it is this condition which makes him unfit and incompe-
tent within the meaning of the statute. Reasonable minds 
could not differ, it is submitted, that it would be seriously 
detrimental to Michael or any child to take him from 
the only parents, brothers, sisters, and environment 
which he knows and to place him with strangers, even 
though one of these strangers is his natural father. 
Fnder the facts of this case, every presumption usually 
indulged in favor of a natural parent must in fact be 
construed to apply to appellants for in the eyes of 
Michael they are his natural and only parents. The 
needs of Michael demand that he remain with appellants. 
This Court is compelled under the facts and law to so 
hold, or at the very least this Court can and should hold 
that the juvenile court does have authority to deprive 
the natural parents of Michael's custody, and remand 
the case for further proceedings. 
The social studies and reports are practically uni-
form in recommending that appellants be allowed to 
adopt Michael. It is only after Deputy County Attorney, 
George E. Ballif, ruled that there were no grounds for 
permanent deprivation that the social studies recom-
mended that Michael be returned to the natural fa th er. 
It is obvious that this recommendation was based on 
that ruling. If this Court decides that the parents can 
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permanently be deprived under the facts and law, then 
clearly the social studies should be accepted which recom-
mend that appellants be allowed to adopt Michael as 
these are not based upon an erroneous legal conclusion. 
POINT 3 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR LEA VE TO ADOPT 
AND THE HEARING THEREOF ON APRIL 7, 1966, SATIS-
FIES THE PROVISIONS OF SUBSECTION 55-10-109(2). 
Although petitioners in their petition do not use the 
words, "termination of parental rights," but rather ask 
for leave to adopt, the meaning is the same. The words 
"termination of parental rights'' are of necessity in-
cluded in the word, "adopt." There can be no adoption 
without such a termination. The phrase, "leave to adopt" 
cannot have failed to convey to the natural parents and 
to their attorney that the issue at the hearing would be 
the termination of their parental rights as well as the 
fitness of the foster parents. Thus it would seem the 
phrase, "leave to adopt," could only have the meaning 
of termination of parental rights as far as the natural 
parents are concerned. 
Further, it is evident from the transcript that the 
issue of the termination of parental rights was in foot 
tried before the court at the hearing April 7, 1966. 
Further, it should be noted that Section 55-10-98 pro-
vides: 
When it appears during the course of any pro-
ceeding in a children's case that the evidence 
presented points to material facts not alleged in 
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the iwtition, the court may proceed to consider 
forthwith the additional or different matters 
raised by the evidence, if the parties consent. In 
such event the court on motion of any interested 
party or on its own motion shall direct that the 
petition be amended to conform to the evidence. 
If the amendment results in a substantial depar-
ture from the facts originally alleged, the court 
sh~ll grant such continuance as justice may re-
qmre. 
By presenting evidence on the issue of tennination 
of parental rights it would appear that the parties have 
consented to the court considering the matter of tennina-
tion of parental rights, and the court on its own motion 
can amend the petition to conform. Further, it must be 
remembered that the natural parents were represented 
by capable counsel at said hearing. 
Appellants in their brief (R. 36) pointed out to the 
couflt that it could amend the petition to conform to the 
evidence, and in the event the court did not do so, asked 
leave to amend to conform to the evidence. The court 
did not specifically act upon this motion. All in all there 
has been a substantial compliance with the provision 
of Subsection 55-10-109 (2). However, if this court holds 
otherwise on this issue, the decree should nevertheless 
be reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile 
court for another hearing held in compliance with this 
Court's decision. 
CONOLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the decree of the juvenile 
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court reqmrmg appellant:,; to return :Michael Patrick 
Kelsey to his natural father should be reversed and ap-
pellants granted leave to adopt, or failing that the said 
decree should be reversed and the case remanded to the 
juvenile court for a further hearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
700 Utah Savings Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellams 
